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Abstract: This paper considers a two-period model in which managers have su-
perior information about their ability to forecast the realization of given investment
projects. Firms compete for managers by o¤ering short-run contracts. As future
salaries depend on current play through its impact on managerial reputation, man-
agers’ investment decisions are a¤ected by their concern for their future careers. We
analyze the interaction between these implicit incentives, created by managers’ ca-
reer concerns, and the explicit incentives made possible by contingent compensation.
We show that managers’ career concerns create perverse incentives that are robust to
the introduction of contingent contracting. We also …nd that while managerial com-
pensation is monotonically increasing in pro…t at date 2, it is not at date 1. Two
numerical exercises relate the implications of our results to the literature on the link
between pay and performance. In line with empirical …ndings, we …nd that: i) the
pay-performance sensitivity is highest in the …nal period of managers’ employment; ii)
higher pay-performance sensitivities are associated with a lower variance of pro…ts.
1 Introduction
The literature on managerial compensation has dedicated a close attention to the trade-o¤ in
the provision of incentives and insurance arising because of managers’ risk and e¤ort aversions.
In this paper we depart from this view and focus on the impact of managers’ talent on managerial
compensation and incentives. In particular we consider a market for managerial services and
analyze the interplay of implicit (reputational) and explicit (compensation) incentives of managers.
A manager is assumed to have private information about his ability to distinguish a pro…table
investment project from an unpro…table one. Firms have imperfect knowledge about this ability,
and therefore the investment decision of a manager and its …nal outcome are used to update the
estimates of his skills. Because of this dependance on the past, a manager’s choices are in‡uenced
by his preoccupation with his future salaries, a component which we will refer to as career or
reputational concern.
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acknowledge the research assistance of Ramón Xifré. The usual disclaimer applies.
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This paper studies how, when, and to what extent short-run contingent contracts can o¤set
the distortions created by career concerns and analyzes the implications of this on investment
decisions, contracts, and the link between pay and performance measures. To address these
issues we construct a two-period model of managerial compensation with career concerns and
characterize equilibrium contracts and investment decisions.
We …nd that managers’ reputational concerns create perverse incentives that can be only par-
tially o¤set by contingent compensation. In particular we show that (i) investment decisions in
period 2 are e¢cient, but investment decisions in period 1 depend on managers’ initial reputa-
tion: A manager will overinvest when his reputation is low, invest e¢ciently when it is high and
underinvest when it is intermediate; (ii) managerial compensation is monotonically increasing in
performance in period 2 but not in period 1: Generous compensation in the face of poor results
may be required to induce managers to take appropriate investment actions that may compromise
their future careers.1
We explore the implications of our results by performing two numerical exercises on the joint
distribution of equilibrium salaries and performance measures with the goal to verify whether the
predictions of the model are consistent with existing empirical studies.
Our …rst numerical exercise …nds that the pay-performance sensitivity is higher in the …nal
period of managers’ employment than in the initial one, in line with Gibbons and Murphy’s (1992)
empirical …nding that the pay-performance elasticities of CEO’s of large US companies increase as
they approach retirement. Our second numerical exercise demonstrates that the pay-performance
sensitivity is decreasing in the …rm’s variance of pro…ts, in line with the empirical …ndings of
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
The theoretical models that motivated the previous empirical research focused their attention
on the optimal design of incentives for homogenous risk averse managers to exert appropriate lev-
els of e¤ort.2 In contrast, our model proposes a di¤erent perspective on the agency relationship
between managers and shareholders–one that is centered on competing …rms that try to provide
incentives to make appropriate decisions for risk neutral managers who may have private infor-
mation about their forecasting ability. Although we share the general view that managerial risk
aversion is a fundamental component of the agency relationship between management and owner-
ship, in this paper we abstract from it to focus on the impact of career concerns and asymmetric
information on managerial contracting. Our numerical exercises show that our predictions are
not invalidated by documented empirical regularities, and we therefore consider our model as a
possibly complementary view of the nature of the agency relationship between management and
ownership.
Our work is related to the literature on managerial career concerns initiated by Fama (1980)
and Holmström (1982). Fama (1980) argued that a manager’s career concern provides incentives
to make optimal decisions over and above the predictions of a static model. Holmström (1982)
showed that career concerns are not necessarily su¢cient to align managers’ interests with …rms’
objectives. This work started a research agenda that has mainly concentrated on how reputational
concerns may provide incentives to (partially) solve static ine¢ciencies.3
1This result is a possible explanation for frequently observed contractual provisions, as, for instance, “golden
parachutes,” through which top managers enjoy very generous compensation in the face of such negative events as
dismissals and hostile takeovers.
2Several authors, including, Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986) and Murphy (1999), have in fact questioned
the importance of managerial e¤ort aversion in the agency relationship between shareholders and top executives.
3Among others, this line of research has been explored by Diamond (1989), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Meyer
and Vickers (1997), and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999a, 1999b).
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Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986) were among the …rst to analyze the possibly perverse
incentives of reputational concerns: “[...] reputation is the source rather than the resolution of
incentive problems.”4 Since in our model, without career concerns e¢ciency would be attained in
equilibrium, in spirit our work is more closely related to research in this latter direction.
Our work also relates to research on the impact of career concerns on managerial attitudes
towards investment. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut (1989) and
Zwiebel (1995), among others, have argued, that career concerns result in managerial conservatism
and therefore, in systematic underinvestment. Other authors have maintained that career concerns
lead to excessive risk taking or overinvestment (see, e.g., Ricart i Costa (1988), or Holmström and
Ricart i Costa (1986), for su¢ciently low risk aversion). Prendergast and Stole (1996) have
argued that managers tend to be prone to exaggeration in the beginning of their careers and to
conservatism at the end. Our result is that in the beginning of a manager’s career his attitude to
investment depends on his initial reputation: when his initial reputation is bad, overinvestment
arises, for intermediate values underinvestment results, while a manager with a su¢ciently good
initial reputation takes e¢cient investment decisions.
This paper shares the view of another strand of literature, including Jeon (1998) and Kanodia,
Bushman and Dickhaut (1989), that focuses on forecasting as themain input provided by managers
and the desire to build a reputation for accuracy as the source of the agency problem in an
asymmetric information setting. Our work di¤ers from theirs, and in fact from virtually all
of the literature on career concerns, in that it takes into account the possibility of contingent
compensation to provide explicit incentives to either reinforce or counterbalance the implicit
incentives provided by career concerns.5
Our results also provide implications on the relationship between managerial pay and measures
of …rm performance and our contributions are best understood in relationship to existing work
by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) see career concerns as providing managers with incentives to work
hard in the early stages of their careers. Given managers are risk averse, making compensation
responsive to random performance is costly and an extensive use of contingent compensation is
made only when necessary, i.e., in the late stages of a manager’s career, when the incentives pro-
vided by career concerns are fading. The implication of this is that the pay-performance sensitivity
increases as retirement approaches.
Our paper is an attempt to show that, while career concerns may be responsible for the
increase in pay-performance sensitivity, the reasons behind this may be altogether di¤erent. We
show that competition ensures that pay is monotonic in performance in the second period, and
we view career concerns as creating perverse incentives that require nonmonotonic pay schedules
in the early stages of a manager’s career.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) study the relationship between pay of US top executives and
their …rms’ performance and in particular focus on how the pay-performance sensitivity varies
4Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986), page 837, fn. 2. Similar arguments have been defended by several other
authors and notably by Ricart i Costa, (1988, 1989), Kanodia, Bushman, Dickhaut (1989), Sharfstein and Stein
(1990), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Prendergast (1993), Zwiebel (1995), Prendergast and Stole (1996), Jeon
(1998), and Morris (2001).
5Some of the previously mentioned papers do allow for the possibility of current compensation being contingent
on current performance but restrict the way in which this can happen, by linking current compensation linearly
to current pro…ts as in Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Kanodia, Bushman and
Dickhaut (1989). Prendergast (1993) is the only notable exception in considering the possibility of making com-
pensation contingent on current performance to create incentives to exert forecasting e¤ort. Since this is seen to
create incentives to misreport the …ndings, however, mechanism design in Prendergast (1993) is the solution to the
shirking problem but also the source of a problem of dishonest reporting.
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with the variance of …rms’ pro…ts. Their work is motivated by a classical principal-agent model in
which a risk averse manager is given incentives to exert high e¤ort through a contract that makes
his pay linearly dependent on his …rm’s pro…t. Managerial risk aversion implies that the slope of
the optimal contract is decreasing in the variance of …rm’s pro…t, a prediction validated by their
empirical analysis.
Our second numerical exercise shows that the joint distribution of salaries and pro…ts generated
by our model is in line with Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999) empirical …ndings in that the pay-
performance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of …rms’ pro…ts, but our model proposes a
di¤erent explanation for this regularity. Competition ensures that managers with a high reputation
at the end of their careers are o¤ered contracts with salary payments that are very sensitive to
performance. Because these managers also generate low variances of pro…ts, a negative association
between …rms’ pro…t variances and pay-performance sensitivity arises.6 In this sense our results
question the direction of causality maintained in the empirical studies (from variance to pay-
performance sensitivity) and propose a new standpoint on the problem.
The main contributions of this paper derive from its focus on contingent compensation. On
one side we verify that the perverse incentives of career concerns are robust to the introduction
of contingent contracting. On the other we are able to characterize the impact of contingent
contracting on equilibrium outcomes, and in particular, on investment decisions and on the link
between managerial pay and …rms’ performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 introduces the
equilibrium concept used in the paper. Section 4 o¤ers a characterization of the equilibrium.
Section 5 studies the implications of our analysis on the link between managerial pay and …rms’
performance measures. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
All …rms are risk neutral and each has an investment project available which has a revenue of
z > 0 with probability p, and 0 with probability 1 ¡ p. We normalize the cost of the investment
project to 1 and assume that the investment project is ex-ante pro…table, pz¡ 1 > 0.7 Firms have
available ex-ante identical investment projects.
Managers are risk neutral8 and live for two periods, t = 1; 2. Each manager has an innate
ability to forecast the realization of a given investment project. If employed, a manager only has
to decide whether to invest (I) or not (N) in the project available to the …rm.9 In focusing on
investment decisions only, we subscribe to the widely held view that “[i]n a managerial context
[...] e¤ort is only part of the overall incentive problem” and that it is more important to “worry
about how e¤ective [...] managers are at making decisions”.10
6Unlike the classical literature that sees …rms’ pro…ts variance as exogenous and independent of the manager, we
assume that all …rms are ex-ante identical but the distribution of net pro…ts and, therefore, their variance depends
on the type of the manager–both directly, through his forecasting ability, and indirectly, through his equilibrium
investment decisions.
7Qualitatively similar results are obtained in the case in which pz ¡ 1 < 0.
8Since risk neutrality makes the manager indi¤erent among contracts with the same expected value, many
di¤erent equilibrium contracts will exist. For this reason, in section 4.2.2 we focus on the minimum variance
contract that is arbitrarily close to the contract that would be preferred by a manager with an arbitrarily low
degree of risk aversion.
9A more realistic description would be one in which the manager has to decide whether to invest in a safe or risky
project. We have chosen not to depart from the typical description in the literature. As is clear, this alternative
interpretation only requires mechanical rewording.
10Holmström and Ricart-i-Costa (1986), page 835.
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For simplicity, we assume that only two types of managers exist, good and bad, ¿ 2 fG; Bg.
A good manager is always able to forecast the realization of the investment project, whereas a
bad manager is never able to do so. Thus, before making the decision to invest or not a manager
receives a signal ¾ 2 fV;L;Hg, where V is interpreted as a void signal and L and H as the
low and high signal, respectively. The probability of the project having the high return (z > 0)
conditional on the received signal will be
Pr (z j ¾) =
8<:
p if ¾ = V
0 if ¾ = L
1 if ¾ = H
:
In other words, while signals H and L ensure, respectively, the success or the failure of the
investment project, the void signal, V , provides no additional information and the conditional
probability of success is, therefore, equal to the prior, p.11 A good manager receives signal H with
probability p, and L with probability 1¡ p, whereas a bad manager gets signal V with probability
1. At the beginning of the …rst period there is no asymmetric information about a manager’s
type so that a given manager is commonly believed to be good with probability ¹ and bad with
probability 1 ¡¹. Once a manager is employed, however, he either gets signal H or L or he gets
signal V and in this way he learns his type with probability 1.
We denote the observable …nal outcome of the investment process at date t = 1;2, by P t 2
fN;F;Sg, where N indicates that no investment took place and F and S indicate that the
investment was carried out and it was, respectively, a failure or a success. An investment action
pro…le for a manager at date t is a vector it = (itV ; i
t
L; i
t
H) 2 fN;Ig3 where itV , itL, and itH denote
the decision to invest (I) or not (N) at date t = 1;2 when the signal received by the manager is
respectively V , L, or H .
Firms o¤er one-period contracts to managers. Given one of the main goals of this paper
is to show that reputational concerns generate e¢ciency losses, we consider contracts that are
contingent on the realization of the investment project, P t 2 fN; F; Sg. This seems important, as
it guarantees that these losses are robust to the introduction of optimal contracting. A contract is
therefore a triple wt =
¡
wtN; w
t
F ;w
t
S
¢
, with the constraint that no salary can be negative, wP t ¸ 0,
P t 2 fN;F;Sg, t = 1; 2.12 In other words, while we only allow short run contracts, we allow salary
payments to be made after the realization of the investment process and we therefore introduce
the possibility for compensation to depend also on contemporaneous measures of performance.
Given contracts are short run and the investment projects are serially independent, …rms’ time
horizons are irrelevant and they can be treated as short-run pro…t maximizers. Managers live for
two periods and they maximize their expected discounted lifetime salary
U = E
£
w1(¹)+ ±w2(¹2)
¤
;
where ¹2 = E
£
¹ j P 1¤ is the probability of the manager being good in period 2 conditional upon
the realization of the investment process at time 1, P1, and where ± 2 R+ is the discount factor.13
11Managers with high ability are often described in the literature as being able to generate high expected return
investment projects, i.e., as being able to come up with good ideas. In contrast to this, we refer to managerial
ability as the ability to forecast the realization of a given project: all investment projects are drawn from the same
distribution, regardless of the manager’s ability, but di¤erent managers may have di¤erent abilities to forecast their
realizations.
12We use superscripts for time indices and subscripts for realizations of random variables.
13While this is not important for our results, we also allow cases in which ± > 1, as they can represent situations
in which the factor of growth of the scale of the second period investment project with respect to the …rst period
one more than compensates the manager’s time preference factor.
5
We …nally make the assumption that a …rm can function without a manager, but that in this
case it will get signal V with probability 1. Given investment projects are assumed to be ex-ante
pro…table, investing is the optimal decision for a …rm with no manager (and therefore, without a
signal on the pro…tability of the investment project). This implies that a …rm with no manager
gets an expected pro…t of pz ¡1.14 For managers to care about their reputation, it is necessary to
assume that they appropriate at least part of their reputational rents. For this to happen we need
to assume that they are scarce. To simplify notation and wording in the paper we will consider
the case in which two …rms compete for every single manager. In particular, we assume that every
manager is o¤ered at most a countable set of contracts of the form
¡
wtN ;w
t
F ; w
t
S
¢ 2 R3+ by each
…rm and chooses one contract (if any) out of them. All our results generalize to the case in which
the measure of the set of managers is lower than the measure of the set of …rms and …rms are
allowed to make o¤ers to all managers.15
In the following we summarize the extensive form of the game.
1. Period 1.
N Nature chooses the type of manager, G with probability ¹ and B with probability 1¡¹,
and (independently) the realization of the investment project, S with probability p and
F with probability 1 ¡ p.
F Without observing nature’s choices, each of the two …rms competing for a given man-
ager (commonly known to be good with probability ¹) o¤ers him at most a countable
set of contracts, each of them of the form
¡
w1N ;w
1
F ;w
1
S
¢ 2 R3+.
M Without observing nature’s choices, the manager either accepts an o¤er or rejects them
all.
R If the manager rejects all o¤ers, play restarts at the beginning of period 2.
A If the manager accepts an o¤er, he is hired.
¾ The manager receives a signal, ¾1 2 fV;L;Hg.
i The manager decides whether to invest or not in the given project, i 2 fI;Ng.
P The manager’s play and the realization of the investment project in case the
manager decided to invest are observed, P1 2 fN;F;Sg. The …rm pays the
manager a salary according to the contract accepted by the manager.
2. Period 2 has the same structure as period 1 with one exception. Given that the type of
the manager is the same in both periods, having observed ¾1 in period 1, the manager
knows his type when he considers whether to accept any second period o¤er, while …rms do
not have access to this information. Second period realization of the investment project is
independent of the …rst period one.
We now discuss our modeling choices and the consequences of making di¤erent assumptions.
The assumption that no long term contracts are available is necessary for our results. If a
long term binding contract were feasible at the beginning of a manager’s working life, when no
asymmetric information exists, it would be possible to design it in such a way that managers have
14The qualitative nature of the results of the paper would not change if we made the assumption that the
reservation level for the …rm is 0 rather than pz ¡ 1, i.e., if we assumed that a manager is an essential input in the
production process.
15In this case …rms are allowed to o¤er di¤erent countable sets of contracts to managers with di¤erent beginning
of period probabilities of being good.
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no incentives to distort their investment decisions away from the optimum. We rule out such
binding contracts, as the information revealed after the …rst period creates incentives for at least
one of the parties to break the contract.
In this paper we consider a screening model, i.e., a situation in which the uninformed party
(…rms) make o¤ers. Our results are not sensitive to this choice. In a previous version of this
paper, Caruana and Celentani (1999), we studied the same problem in a signaling setting, i.e.,
in the case in which the informed party (the manager) makes contract o¤ers. In this case the
sets of accepted contracts and equilibrium path investment actions are the same as in the present
paper as long as the second period continuation equilibria (i) satisfy full extraction of the surplus
by the manager, (ii) are Pareto optimal in terms of the investment action pro…le played on the
equilibrium path, and (iii) survive the intuitive criterion. An alternative formulation of a signaling
environment is one in which, in the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (1992), the manager o¤ers a menu
of contracts, the …rm accepts or rejects the menu, and …nally the manager chooses one contract
out of the previously proposed (and accepted) set. With this formulation in all equilibria the set
of accepted contracts and the equilibrium path investment decisions would be the same as in the
present paper.
This paper takes the view that it is important to study the implications of career concerns
when asymmetric information on managerial ability exists. We assume that information is initially
symmetric and that an asymmetry arises only in the course of the …rst period. We consider this
assumption realistic, but it is also important to remark that the equilibrium outcomes of our
model also arise when information is asymmetric from the beginning, although in this latter case
the set of equilibria is larger.
3 Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
In each of the two periods, two …rms compete for a manager believed to be good with prob-
ability ¹ 2 [0; 1] by o¤ering each at most a countable set of short-run (one period) contracts,
w (¹) 2 R3+, conditioning on the public history of the game.
In each of the two periods, the manager accepts a contract or none out of the sets of contracts
o¤ered to him by the two …rms. If the manager accepts, he receives a private signal on the
pro…tability of the project, ¾t 2 fV;L; Hg. Conditioning on the public and the private history of
the game, the manager then decides whether to invest or not in the given project.
Consider a manager who is believed to be good with probability ¹ at the beginning of period
1. His …rst period investment strategy, after having accepted o¤er w1, can be denoted as
i1
¡
¹;w1
¢
=
¡
i1V
¡
¹;w1
¢
; i1L
¡
¹;w1
¢
; i1H
¡
¹;w1
¢¢ 2 fI; Ng3
where i1¾1
¡
¹;w1
¢ 2 fI; Ng denotes the manager’s investment decision conditional on private signal
¾1 2 fV; L;Hg. Similarly, the manager’s second period investment strategy, after having accepted
contract w1 (in period 1), after receiving signal ¾1 (in period 1), given P1, the outcome of the
investment decision process in period 1, and after having accepted the second period o¤er w2 can
be written as
i2
¡
¹; w1;¾1; P1; w2
¢
=
¡
i2V (: : :) ; i
2
L (: : :) ; i
2
H (: : :)
¢ 2 fI;Ng3
where i2
¾2
(: : :) 2 fI;Ng denotes the manager’s investment decision conditional on private signal
¾2 2 fV; L;Hg.
Given that no additional use of notation will be made, we choose not to provide a full descrip-
tion of strategies and strategy spaces. Also, for notational convenience we will occasionally omit
arguments whenever this cannot cause any confusion.
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The equilibrium concept we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To ensure the existence of
such equilibria we will assume the following standard tie-breaking rules: (i) whenever indi¤erent
between the two investment actions (I and N), the manager will play the one with the higher
expected pro…t; (ii) whenever indi¤erent between accepting a contract or rejecting all, the manager
will accept a contract.
As will become clear later on, it is possible that in equilibrium certain realizations of the
investment process in period 1 are observed with probability 0. Given Bayesian updating is not
de…ned after such events, we construct beliefs after such zero-probability realizations making the
assumption that each type of manager is equally likely to make a mistake in playing his investment
strategy.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
The following Lemma presents two simple results that are useful for the subsequent analysis.
Let E [¼ j i; ¹] denote the expected pro…t gross of salary payments as a function of the investment
action pro…le i 2 fI;Ng3 and of the beginning of period probability of the manager being good,
¹ 2 [0;1].
Lemma 1 1. On the equilibrium path it 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N;I) ; (I;N;I)g, t = 1; 2.
2. E [¼ j (I;N; I) ;¹] = (pz ¡ 1) +¹ (1 ¡ p) > E [¼ j i; ¹], for i 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I)g :
3. E [¼ j (N; N; I) ; ¹] = ¹p (z ¡ 1) ¸ (pz ¡ 1) = E [¼ j (I; I; I) ;¹] if and only if
z · 1 ¡ ¹p
p(1 ¡¹): (1)
Proof. For part 1 suppose that in equilibrium a …rst period o¤er w1 is made such that
i1
¡
¹;w1
¢
=2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I) ; (I;N;I)g :
Because w1 2 R3+ and given the expected gross pro…t from i =2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I) ; (I;N;I)g is
strictly less than pz ¡ 1 > 0, the net expected payo¤ to the …rm o¤ering this contract is strictly
less than pz ¡ 1 > 0. Given a …rm with no manager earns pz ¡ 1 > 0, withdrawing all o¤ers is
a pro…table deviation for the …rm and a contradiction arises. The same arguments applies for
second period o¤ers. Parts 2 and 3 are established through straightforward computations.
Part 1 of Lemma 1 establishes that the investment action pro…le played on the equilibrium
path in any of the two periods has to be one of (I; I; I), (N; N; I), or (I;N;I). Part 2 states
that, among the three previous investment action pro…les, (I;N;I) always generates the highest
expected pro…t gross of salary payments. Part 3 …nally establishes (1) as a necessary and su¢cient
condition for the expected pro…t gross of salary payments generated by (N;N;I) to be no lower
than the one generated by (I; I; I).
With Lemma 1 we proceed to subsection 4.1 which solves for second period continuation
equilibria. In subsection 4.2, we then move back to the …rst period and characterize the equilibrium
path investment decisions and managerial contracts.
4.1 Second Period
At the beginning of the second period the manager has already privately learned his type. Let
¹2 2 [0; 1] denote the …rms’ (posterior) probability assessment that he is the good manager.16
16In equilibrium this probability is computed from the prior probability, …rst period equilibrium strategies, and
the realization of the …rst period investment process. Note, that although the manager learns privately his type,
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The following Proposition characterizes second period continuation equilibria.
Proposition 1 Assume that at the beginning of period 2 …rms believe that the manager is good
with probability ¹2 2 [0;1]. Then, in any continuation equilibrium:
1. The unique contract which is accepted by both types of managers is:
w2 (¹2) =
¡
w2N (¹2) ;w
2
F (¹2) ; w
2
S (¹2)
¢
=
µ
¹2(1 ¡ p)
1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2
;0;
¹2(1 ¡ p)
p(1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2)
¶
:
2. The investment action pro…le played by the manager on the equilibrium path is:
i2 = (I; N; I)
Proof. Appendix.
Proposition 1 analyzes the impact of asymmetric information on second period continuation
equilibria and shows that they are
1. Pooling: A manager that is believed to be good with probability ¹2 at the beginning of
period 2 will accept o¤er w2 (¹2) regardless of whether he is in fact good or bad.
2. E¢cient: On the equilibrium path the manager plays the e¢cient investment action pro…le.
To see why second period continuation equilibria are e¢cient, note that competition for man-
agers tends to lead to surplus maximization (e¢ciency). In the manager’s second period of life, his
last, nothing counters this tendency to e¢ciency as the manager’s only incentives are the explicit
ones provided by the contract he accepts.
To see that second period continuation equilibria are pooling it is necessary to show that
o¤ers that are more attractive to a good manager are not pro…table deviations for the …rms.
The following argument will show that this is the case because, once the incentive compatibility
constraints are kept into account, the indi¤erence curves of the two types of managers do not
intersect, and o¤ers that are preferred by a good manager are also preferred by a bad manager.
Without loss of generality assume …rst that w2F (¹2) = 0
17 and consider pairs
¡
w2N ;w
2
S
¢ 2 R2+.
Figure 1 depicts the indi¤erence curves for the good and the bad manager in that space keeping into
account their incentive compatibility constraints. Given that in the second period the incentives
are simply determined by explicit compensation, it is easy to see that so long as wS ¸ wN (i.e.,
below the 45 degree line) the typical indi¤erence curve for the good manager is the negatively
sloped line represented as UG as a good manager’s expected utility is pwS+(1 ¡ p)wN (if wS < wN
the manager would always refrain from investing and his utility would be wN). The typical
indi¤erence curve for the bad manager instead is like the kinked line represented as UB: Above
line (IC) (i.e., whenever pw2S (¹2) < w
2
N (¹2)) a bad manager chooses not to invest and gets wN ,
whereas below line (IC) (i.e., when pw2S (¹2) ¸ w2N (¹2)) he chooses to invest and gets pwS.
In equilibrium managers fully extract their expected value and thus …rms only make pz ¡ 1
in expected terms. In Figure 1 we represent the condition ensuring this as the broken double line
(FE). Given this, it is easy to verify that any contract on (FE) but di¤erent from the intersection
…rms may in fact also learn his type from …rst period play, as shown by Lemma 2, below. In other words, there are
cases in which in equilibrium ¹2 is either 0 or 1.
17By this we mean that (i) in equilibrium w2F (¹2) = 0 has to hold and (ii) if no pro…table deviation with
w2F (¹2) = 0 from a proposed equilibrium exists, then no pro…table deviation exists at all.
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of lines (IC) and the rightmost part of (FE) is such that a pro…table deviation for a …rm exists
(attracting only good managers), whereas no such deviation exists for the contract at that inter-
section. It is easy to check that this last contract is the one mentioned in Proposition 1,18 and
the result follows.
An interesting implication of Proposition 1 is that equilibrium wages are increasing in gross
pro…t as they are highest when the outcome is success, intermediate when the outcome is no
investment, and lowest when the outcome is failure. For expositional purposes, Figure 2 depicts
w2S (¹2) and w
2
N (¹2) for the case in which p = :6, a case we will also consider in subsection 4.2.2.
4.2 First Period
Consider the continuation game starting after a manager believed to be good with probability
¹ accepts …rst period contract o¤er w1. From Proposition 1, and given the tie-breaking rule
assumed in section 3, all perfect Bayesian equilibria of this continuation game are identical in …rst
period investment strategies and in the distribution over second period accepted contracts.
Let i
¡
w1;¹
¢
denote such a …rst period investment strategy and let E
£
w2
¡
¹2
¢ j ¿¤ be the
expected value of the accepted second period contract for a manager of type ¿ 2 fG; Bg who is
believed to be good with probability ¹2 in the beginning of period 2.
For a …xed w = (wN ;wF ; wS) 2 R3+ let E [w j i; ¹] be the expected salary payment when the
manager is commonly believed to be good with probability ¹ (at the beginning of the period) and
when he plays the investment strategy i.
Since there is no asymmetry of information at the beginning of period 1, and because the two
…rms are competing for one manager, by a standard Bertrand pricing argument, o¤ers that will
be accepted with positive probability by the manager have to be such that the proposing …rm’s
expected pro…ts are exactly pz ¡ 1.19 Given a manager accepts the o¤er that guarantees him
the highest lifetime utility, in period 1 the o¤ers that are accepted in equilibrium with positive
probability are such that
w1 2arg max
w1
E
£
w1+ ±E
£
w2(¹2) j ¿¤ j i ¡w1;¹¢ ;¹¤
s.t. w1N ;w
1
F ; w
1
S ¸ 0
E
£
¼ ¡w1 j i1 ¡w1; ¹¢ ; ¹¤ = pz ¡ 1:
The objective function is a manager’s lifetime expected discounted salary given the fact that both
he and the …rm correctly anticipate continuation equilibrium play. In other words, it already
incorporates the ex-post incentives that a manager will face after observing his private signal,
that is, the reputational consequences of his play. This is taken into account by having the …rst
and second period expected salaries conditioned on the prior probability of the manager being
good and on the continuation equilibrium investment strategy i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
.
The following Lemma provides the probability of the manager being good, conditional on the
…rst period investment strategy and the public realization of the …rst period investment process.
Lemma 2 Let w1 2 R3+ be given.
18Notice that the contract in Lemma 1 is such that pw2S (¹2) = w
2
N (¹2) and gives the …rm expected pro…t pz¡1.
19More precisely, if this were not the case, there is an " > 0 such that a …rm that has an equilibrium payo¤ no
higher than the minimum of the two would have an incentive to o¤er " more for all realizations of the …rst period
investment process. This is the case as o¤ering " more for all realizations of the …rst period investment process
implies that the continuation strategies after acceptance by the manager are unchanged.
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1. If i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (I; I; I), then ¹2 (S) = ¹2 (F ) = ¹2 (N) = ¹.
2. If i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (I;N;I), then ¹2 (S) = ¹, ¹2 (F) = 0, ¹2 (N ) = 1.
3. If i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (N;N; I), then ¹2 (S) = 1, ¹2 (F ) = ¹, ¹2 (N) = ¹(1¡p)1¡¹p .
Proof. In the second case ¹2 (:) is pinned down by Bayes’s rule. In the …rst case (for ¹2 (N ))
and the third case (for ¹2 (F)) this cannot be done. As was remarked in subsection 3 we make the
assumption that the two types of players are equally likely to make a mistake in their investment
decision. This assumption implies that if i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (I; I; I), then ¹2 (N ) = ¹, and if i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
=
(N; N; I), then ¹2 (F) = ¹.
Lemma 3 uses Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 to compute continuation equilibria payo¤s, a result
that simpli…es the computation of the …rst period equilibrium.
Lemma 3 For all w1 2 R3+, E
£
E
£
w2
¡
¹2
¢ j ¿¤ j i1 ¡w1;¹¢ ; ¹¤ = ¹ (1 ¡ p).
Proof. Since we know from Lemma 1 that in any continuation equilibrium
i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢ 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I) ; (I;N;I)g ;
we need to consider three di¤erent cases, depending on which of the previous investment strategies
is played after a given w1 2 R3+. This can be checked through straightforward calculations using
w2
¡
¹2
¢
from Proposition 1 and the posterior probabilities of the manager being good under
i1
¡
w1;¹
¢ 2 f(I; I; I) ; (N; N; I) ; (I;N;I)g provided in Lemma 2.
From Lemma 3, the maximization problem above can be simpli…ed as follows
max
w1
E
£
w1 j i¡w1;¹¢ ; ¹¤ + ±¹ (1 ¡ p)
s.t. w1N; w
1
F ;w
1
S ¸ 0
E
£
¼ ¡ w1 j i1 ¡w1;¹¢ ;¹¤ = pz ¡ 1
Thus, the …rst period o¤ers that are accepted are simply those that maximize the manager’s
…rst period payo¤, because the expected second period payo¤s do not depend on the …rst pe-
riod accepted o¤er. This is not to say that career concerns do not have an ex-ante-impact, as
i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
does depend on career concerns for any given w1 2 R3+ and ¹ 2 (0; 1). In other words,
career concerns are important to the extent that they induce the manager ex-post, i.e., once he
has observed his private signal and, consequently, learned his type, to make certain investment
decisions rather than others. Since di¤erent investment strategies imply di¤erent expected net
pro…ts, career concerns do play a role in the manager’s …rst period equilibrium accepted o¤er.
4.2.1 First Period Investment Strategies Let
ez (¹) = (1 ¡¹p)Ã 1
p(1 ¡¹) ¡ ±
(1 ¡ p) ¡¹p2¡ 4¹p+ 3¹ + 1¢
(2 ¡ p) (1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p)) (1 ¡ 3¹p +¹ + ¹p2)
!
¹¤ =
±
2 + ± ¡ p:
The following proposition provides a complete characterization of the investment action pro…les
played on the …rst period equilibrium path.
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Proposition 2 Let (¹; z; ±) 2 [0;1] £
³
1
p; 1
´
£ R+ be given and let i1 and w1be part of an
equilibrium. Then,
1. i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I; N; I), if and only if ¹ 2 [¹¤; 1].
2. i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (N; N; I) if and only if ¹ 2 [0;¹¤) and z 2
h
1
p ; ez (¹)i.
3. i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I; I; I) if and only if ¹ 2 [0; ¹¤) and z > ez (¹).
Proof. Appendix.
The results of Proposition 2 are depicted in Figure 3, where, for a given value of p, we plot
in the (¹; z) space the investment action pro…le played in the …rst period equilibrium path. Note
that Lemma 10 in the Appendix shows that ez (¹) is increasing.
The result of Proposition 2 can be summarized in the following terms.
By an equilibrium argument, a manager will always prefer to accept an o¤er that induces him
to play the investment action pro…le with the highest surplus. If a nonempty set of o¤ers such
that, after accepting any element of the set, the manager will play according to the …rst best
pro…le (I;N;I), in equilibrium the manager will accept an o¤er from this set and will then play
according to (I; N; I).
Suppose now the previous set is empty and assume that the expected surplus of (N; N; I) is
larger than that of (I; I; I). By the same argument as above if a nonempty set of o¤ers exists
such that after accepting any element of the set the manager will play according to (N; N; I),
in equilibrium the manager will accept an o¤er from this set and will then play according to
(N; N; I) (underinvestment). If the previous set is empty, or if the expected surplus of (N; N; I)
is smaller than that of (I; I; I), in equilibrium the manager will invest regardless of the signal he
gets, (I; I; I) (overinvestment).
Proposition 2 uses the previous arguments to characterize the sets of parameters for which each
of the three investment action pro…les described above is played in the …rst period equilibrium
path:
1. Suppose a manager plays according to (I;N;I) on the …rst period equilibrium path. The
implicit reputational incentives for the bad manager to deviate are decreasing in ¹ and the
surplus that can beused to o¤set these reputational incentives through explicit compensation
is increasing in ¹ (and is independent of z). As a consequence (I;N; I) can be played in the
…rst period in equilibrium only when ¹ is above a given threshold. Proposition 2 provides
an explicit calculation of this threshold, ¹¤.
2. Suppose a manager plays according to (I;N;I) on the …rst period equilibrium path. The
implicit reputational incentives for the bad manager to deviate are decreasing in ¹ and the
surplus that can beused to o¤set these reputational incentives through explicit compensation
is increasing in ¹ and decreasing in z. This implies that these reputational incentives can
be countered when ¹ is high and z is low, or, in other words, in a region lying below an
increasing function on the (¹; z) space, ez (¹). Once again, Proposition 2 provides an explicit
calculation of such function, ez (¹).20
20Since it can be veri…ed that ez (¹) < 1¡¹pp(1¡¹) , there are cases in which the …rst period investment strategy played
in equilibrium is (I; I ; I ), despite of the fact that it is dominated, not only by (I; N; I) ; but also by (N;N;I).
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By part 1 of Proposition 2 if the initial reputation of the manager is su¢ciently good, then
in the …rst period the manager will play the e¢cient investment action pro…le. If his initial
reputation is not su¢ciently good, then, by parts 2 and 3, over- or underinvestment will occur in
equilibrium depending on whether the initial reputation of the manager is bad or intermediate,
with the region of underinvestment getting smaller the more pro…table the investment project is
in expected terms (the higher z) and eventually disappearing (when z ¸ ez (¹¤)).
The rest of this section completes the analysis of equilibrium by turning attention to …rst
period equilibrium accepted contracts.
4.2.2 Characterization of First Period Contracts The set of …rst period contracts that
can be accepted in an equilibrium can simply be derived as the set of contracts w1 2 R3+ that are
such that the continuation equilibrium …rst period investment strategy, i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
, satis…es the
conditions of Proposition 2 and such that in the continuation equilibrium …rms break even,
E
£
¼ ¡w1 j i1 ¡w1;¹¢ ; ¹¤ = pz ¡ 1:
The assumption of managerial risk neutrality implies that many di¤erent …rst period contracts
(with the same expected value) can be accepted by the manager in di¤erent equilibria, and that
all equilibria are identical in the distribution over investment outcomes and in the expected …rst
period payo¤ to the manager and the …rm. Although the objective of the paper is to focus
on career concerns alone, the multiplicity of equilibria in …rst period accepted contracts is an
arti…cial product of the extreme assumption of risk neutrality. Any arbitrarily small amount of
risk aversion would break the tie among all …rst period contracts with the same expected value.
Although we do not reproduce the proof here, it is easy to verify that for any sequence of strictly
concave utility functions that tend to a linear utility function, the limit optimal contract in a set
of contracts with the same expected value is the one that minimizes variance. For this reason,
whenever multiple equilibrium accepted contracts exist, in the rest of the paper we focus on the
one with the minimum variance.
To provide an intuition about the results we will consider a numerical example in which we
will assume that ± = 1, p = :6, and z = 1:7. The qualitative nature of the results for this example
can be veri…ed to be independent of the parameter values.
First and second period equilibrium contracts are plotted against the beginning of period
probability of the manager being good in Figures 4 and 2, respectively.21 Notice that in this
case z < ez (¹¤), so that there are managers of ex ante types ¹ such that case 2 of Proposition 2
(underinvestment) arises.
As Figure 4 shows, there are three di¤erent regions of …rst period contracts, each corresponding
to one of the three regions mentioned in Proposition 2.
Consider …rst ¹ 2 [0; e¹), with e¹ = 0:34145. In this region, the prior probability of a manager
being good is too low for a contract to exist, in which …rms break even and the equilibrium
investment decisions are di¤erent from i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (I; I; I). The equilibrium contract is therefore
w = (0; 0;0) ; and managerial compensation is constant in …rm performance.
In the second region, corresponding to ¹ 2 [e¹; ¹¤), ¹¤ = 0:41667, while the manager’s prior
probability of being good is not su¢cient to have a contract that has …rms break even, and such
that the e¢cient investment strategy is played, there is a set of contracts that ensure i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
=
21While the contracts for the second period can be easily plotted using the results of Lemma 1, the equilibrium
contracts for period 1 have been computed by a Matlab program, developed by Ramón Xifré. We use the same
program in section 5 below to analyze the aggregate relationship between managerial pay and …rm performance.
The program is available upon request from the authors.
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(N; N; I). Although by Proposition 2, all such contracts can arise in equilibrium, in Figure 4 we
single out the contract that minimizes the variance of compensation.22 From Figure 4 it is easy
to see that for all values of ¹ in this region wN > wS > wF ; so that managerial compensation
is not monotonically increasing in …rms’ pro…ts. Note that wN > wS to guarantee that the bad
manager (who gets the void signal) prefers not to invest despite his unambiguous reputational
incentives to invest (from Lemma 2 in this region ¹2 (N ) < ¹2 (F) and ¹2 (N) < ¹2 (S)).
In the third region, corresponding to ¹ 2 [¹¤; 1], the manager’s initial reputation is su¢cient
for a set of contracts to exist, such that in the continuation equilibrium the manager will play
the e¢cient investment strategy, i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I; N; I). From Figure 4 it is easy to check that
in this area wF > wS > wN ; so that, again, managerial compensation is nonmonotonic in …rms’
performance. It is easy to verify from Lemma 2 that in this area the expected posterior for a
manager who gets the void signal is ¹p when investing, while it is equal to 1 when not investing.
This implies that the bad manager has implicit (reputational) incentives not to invest. To coun-
terbalance these implicit incentives, the contract has to satisfy wF > wN ; as to ensure that the
(bad) manager who gets the void signal makes the e¢cient decision to invest.
5 The Link Between Pay and Performance
The goal of this section is to investigate some implications of our results on the link between
managerial compensation and …rm performance.
For this purpose we …rst compute the joint probability distribution over salaries and pro…t
generated by equilibrium play. As was done in the previous section, we cope with the multiplicity
of …rst period equilibrium contracts, by singling out the equilibrium contract with the lowest
variance for each value of ¹.
We then turn to the link between pay and performance by performing regression analyses on
the equilibrium distribution over salaries and pro…ts. Because we our interested in …nding out
whether the equilibrium prediction of our models are consistent with available evidence, we will
try to reproduce the econometric analyses of two works on the link between pay and performance,
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
In this section we take into account managerial heterogeneity, in the sense that we consider
a population of managers with di¤erent prior probabilities of being good in the beginning of
their careers. We also take the view that, while a manager and the …rms competing for him
know the manager’s idiosyncratic ¹, i.e., his idiosyncratic prior probability of being good, the
econometrician has no such direct knowledge.
5.1 Career Concerns and the Link Between Pay and Performance
In this subsection we analyze the link between pay and performance by considering separately
the joint distribution of compensation and pro…t for each of the two periods.23 We consider pro…ts
both net and gross of salary payments. We use each of these distributions to regress salaries
on pro…ts and we interpret the resulting OLS coe¢cients as measures of the pay-performance
sensitivity.
22Since in this region failure never occurs in equilibrium, the value of wF is in fact irrelevant for the variance of
compensation. In Figure 4 we depict the highest wF that satis…es the incentive compatibility constraints, given wS
and wN . In other words all values of wF on or below the levels shown in Figure 4 are equivalent both from the
point of view of incentives and from the point of view of the variance of managerial compensation.
23Notice that the second period aggregate distribution is computed using the posterior probability of each type of
manager’s being good in the beginning of period 2 given equilibrium play and equilibrium learning about his type.
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To check the robustness of our results we have repeated the above computations for many
di¤erent initial distributions of ¹ given by di¤erent Beta distributions, Be(®; ¯), with di¤erent
values for the parameters ® and ¯. Given the qualitative results are the same for all distributions,
in this subsection, as well as in the following one, we will report our results on only four di¤erent
distributions representing a uniform distribution (® = ¯ = 1), two skewed distributions (® = 3,
¯ = 1:5, right skewed, and ® = 1:5, ¯ = 3, left skewed) and a symmetric distribution with a lower
variance than the uniform distribution (® = ¯ = 3). Figure 5 provides the plots of densities for
each of these four cases.
The computations to be presented below are performed for the same parameter speci…cation
used in the example in subsection 4.2.2 above. The qualitative nature of the results have been
veri…ed to be the same for all the other parameter speci…cations that we have considered.
The …rst and second column of Table 1 report the OLS coe¢cients for, respectively, …rst and
second period when salaries are regressed on pro…ts gross of salary payments and show that the
magnitude of the pay-performance sensitivity is always higher in the second period than in the
…rst.24
The third and fourth column of Table 1 report the OLS coe¢cients for …rst and second period
when salaries are regressed on pro…ts net of salary payments. The results on the relative magnitude
of the pay-performance sensitivity in the …rst and the second period are preserved although the
pay-performance sensitivity in the …rst period is now negative.
To perform comparisons with empirical studies that use changes in …rms’ stock market val-
uations the appropriate measure would seem to be pro…ts net of salary payments because …rms’
market valuations should discount the cost of managerial compensation. Despite this observation,
we regard the results for the case of pro…ts gross of salary payments as more interesting for the
following reason. As was mentioned in section 2, for managers to care about their reputation
it is necessary that they appropriate at least part of their reputational rents. For the sake of
simplicity, our model makes the extreme assumption that competition ensures that a manager
appropriates all his reputational rents. This implies that in our model, unlike in reality, a man-
ager’s compensation package may be sizable with respect to the …rm’s pro…t,25 so that managerial
compensation may even reverse the relative orderings of pro…t realizations. In other words, we
believe that the negative coe¢cients in the regressions of …rst period salaries and net pro…ts are
an arti…cial consequence of the disproportionate relative size of managerial compensation to …rms’
pro…ts and we therefore focus our attention on the relationship between salaries and pro…ts gross
of managerial compensation.26
The results reported in Table 1 are in line with Gibbons and Murphy’s (1992) empirical …nding
that the sensitivity of managerial pay to …rm performance increases as retirement nears. Gibbons
and Murphy’s (1992) theoretical explanation for this result is that as retirement nears stronger
explicit (compensation) incentives are needed to substitute the fading implicit (reputational)
incentives. The reason behind the same result in our model is, however, completely di¤erent and
will be discussed in the following.
The di¤erence between the joint distributions of salaries and pro…ts in the …rst and the second
24We also computed pay-performance elasticities and pay–performance correlations and found that the values of
the coe¢cients are always larger in the second period than in the …rst.
25Many empirical studies have documented the fact that CEO’s compensation packages are very small in com-
parison to …rms’ changes of value.
26This idea can be formalized as follows. Suppose that the regression coe¢cient with pro…ts gross of salary
payments is positive and the one with pro…ts net of salary payments is negative. If managerial salaries w are
multiplied by a constant ·, then it is easy to show that for a su¢ciently low value of · the regression coe¢cient
with pro…ts net of salary payments is also positive.
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period depends on two main factors: (a) Managerial compensation in period 2 is increasing
in pro…t but is nonmonotonic in period 1 (see Figures 2 and 4); (b) As time goes by, …rms get
additional information about managers and update their estimates of their abilities. This suggests
that the di¤erence between pay-performance sensitivity in the …rst and the second period could
be decomposed into two e¤ects : the career concerns e¤ect arising because of (a) and the learning
e¤ect due to (b). Because learning in our model is sometimes rather extreme–at the end of the
…rst period it is learned that some managers are good and some bad with probability 1–it is
important to assess the contribution of each of these e¤ects to the overall result to ensure it is
not driven by these somewhat extreme assumptions. To do so, we performed the same exercise in
the second period but, instead of using the posterior distribution over ¹ generated by equilibrium
play and learning, we used the prior distributions (as in Figure 5)–thus shutting down the learning
e¤ect. The resulting slopes (not reported here) are very close to the slopes reported in Table 1,
but in fact between 4.5% and 8.3% higher than them. The implication of this is that in these cases
the learning e¤ect is not very sizable in absolute terms, but in fact it is also negative: Keeping
equilibrium learning into account does not increase the slope for the second period, it reduces
it. Given this, the di¤erence in compensation schedules, the career concern e¤ect, emerges as the
driving force behind the increasing pay-performance sensitivity.27
5.2 Risk and Executive Compensation
The relationship between executive pay and …rm performance has been the object of exten-
sive research. Holmström and Milgrom (1987) studied the optimal compensation schedule for a
repeated agency problem and found that, under appropriate conditions, it is linear in …rm perfor-
mance and that its slope is decreasing in the variance of pro…ts, which is equal to the (exogenous)
variance of a …rm speci…c error term. To test this prediction Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)
propose the following speci…cation as an approximation of the optimal contract:28
wijt = °0+ °1¼jt + °2F
¡
¾2jt
¢
¼jt +°3F
¡
¾2jt
¢
+ t¸ + "it: (2)
Subindices i, j, and t refer, respectively, to the executive, the …rm and the period, wijt is the ex-
ecutive’s compensation, ¼jt is the return to shareholders, F
³
¾2jt
´
is the (cumulative) distribution
function of the variance of returns of the …rm, ¸t is a year e¤ect, and "it is the error term. The
pay-performance sensitivity for a manager working for a …rm with variance ¾2jt is °1+°2F
³
¾2jt
´
,
and this speci…cation makes it is easy to compute the pay-performance sensitivity at any per-
centile of the distribution of variances. For example, the pay-performance sensitivities of the
managers working for the …rm with the lowest, median, and highest variances are, respectively,
°1, °1+ 0:5°2, and °1+ °2. The prediction of the standard principal-agent model is that °1 > 0
and °2 < 0 (°1+°2 > 0). In other words, while higher performance leads to higher compensation,
the e¤ect of returns on compensation will be smaller at …rms with more variable returns. The clas-
sical principal-agent model makes no clear prediction about the relationship between variance of
returns and the level of compensation (as opposed to the slope of the pay-performance schedule),
but Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) also introduce °3F
³
¾2jt
´
to make sure that their estimates of
°2 “are not a¤ected by any relationship between the variance and the level of compensation that
may happen to exist in the cross section.”29
27Other simulations we performed show that the learning e¤ect can be both positive and negative.
28See equation (2) in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), page 77.
29Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), page 78.
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Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) estimate the above equation using US data for 1993-96. Wages
are de…ned to be yearly dollar compensations to CEO’s (in thousands of dollars) and returns as
yearly dollar returns to …rms (in millions of dollars). To compute the variances of returns for each
individual …rm they use monthly data observations of stock returns in the previous 60 months.
Their main results on the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and variance of …rm
returns are presented in column 1 of their Table 3 where they provide the median regression
estimates of the coe¢cient in the above speci…cation: °1 = 27:596, °2 = ¡26:147.30 Both
coe¢cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from 0 and are consistent with the predictions of the standard
principal-agent model: the estimated pay-performance sensitivities of the managers working for
the …rm with the lowest, median, and highest variances turn out to be, respectively,
°1 = 27:596
°1 +0:5°2 = 14:5225
°1+ °2 = 1:449:
To verify whether our model is consistent with Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999) results we
estimate the coe¢cients of the same speci…cation as in (2) using the joint distribution of salaries,
pro…ts and theoretical pro…t variances generated by our model. Because Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) do not take into account the numbers of years before retirement, we use the average of
the joint distributions for the …rst and the second period, thereby implicitly assuming that half
of the managers are in the early stage of their career (period 1) and the other half in their
…nal stage (period 2) with the idea that two overlapping generations of managers live at the
same date.31 Since we only consider one date, we ignore the year e¤ect, ¸t. Finally, given our
compensation realizations do not exhibit the same outliers as the data we compute OLS estimates
of the coe¢cients.
As in the previous subsection, to check the robustness of our results we have repeated the above
computations for many di¤erent initial distributions of ¹ given by di¤erent Beta distributions,
Be(®;¯), with di¤erent values for the parameters ® and ¯. Given the results are qualitatively
the same for all distributions, we report our results only for the same four di¤erent distributions
considered in the previous subsection (see Figure 5). Our results for these cases are summarized
in Table 2: As in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), °1 is positive and °2 negative;
32 Table 2 also
provides the pay-performance sensitivities for the managers who are employed by the …rm with
the lowest, median, and largest variance in the population.
Since the pay-performance sensitivity is in fact decreasing in the (theoretical) variance of …rm
returns, our model turns out to be observationally equivalent to the standard principal-agent
model and the documented relationship between risk and pay-performance sensitivity may be due
to reasons di¤erent from the ones put forward by it.
30Given the right skewness of compensation distributions, due to the fact that some CEO’s are also the founders
and main shareholders of some companies, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) advocate the use of median regression
rather than OLS to get estimates that depend less on these outliers.
31If we de…ne the second period of a CEO as the last three years in o¢ce, and the previous years as the …rst
period (as in Gibbons and Murphy, 1992), assuming that half of the population of CEO is in its second period is
probably an overestimate. We checked that our results were valid also for lower fractions of old managers in the
population, but given we do not regard our analysis as a quantitative calibration exercise, we present the results
for equal fractions of young and old managers.
32We should mention that while Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) …nd a positive value for °3 , our numerical ex-
periments provide negative values. As will be clear below this is a consequence of the fact that better managers
generate lower variances and are better paid so that a negative relationship arises between variance and the level of
compensation. We believe that if we allowed …rms of di¤erent sizes and allowed larger …rms to hire better managers,
the size e¤ect might counterbalance the e¤ect mentioned above and reverse the sign of this coe¢cient.
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Figures 6 and 7 show the variance of pro…ts of a …rm as a function of its manager’s age and
beginning of period probability of being good. When a manager is in his …rst period and has
a low initial value of ¹ the variance of gross pro…t is maximal (Figure 6) and his pay does not
depend on realized pro…t at all (wN = wF = wS = 0, Figure 4). For both intermediate and higher
values of ¹, the variance of pro…t will be lower (Figure 6) and his pay will depend on pro…ts but
in a nonmonotonic way (Figure 4). While the …rst observation seems to contribute to a negative
association of pay-performance sensitivity and variance, the second has an unclear e¤ect.
Consider now a manager in his second period. From Figure 2 it is easy to see that both wS¡wN
and wN ¡ wF are increasing in ¹.33 Given pro…t realizations (before salaries) are independent
of ¹, the previous observation clari…es that in the second period a manager’s pay-performance
sensitivity is increasing in ¹, his beginning of period probability of being good. Figure 7 shows,
on the other hand, that the variance of pro…ts is decreasing in the same probability so that a
negative association between pay-performance sensitivity and pro…t variance arises.
The previous arguments suggest that the negative association between pay-performance sen-
sitivity and variance of pro…ts is mainly due to the compensation patterns of heterogeneous
managers in the late stages of their careers. This intuition is con…rmed by the fact that running
similar regressions for managers in their …rst and second period separately, the results we have
presented are con…rmed (and in fact magni…ed in absolute terms) for managers in their second
period, but are unclear for managers in their …rst period.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) also show that omitting variances (i.e., imposing °2 = °3 = 0)
leads to an estimate of the pay-performance sensitivity of 3.47 (a result in line with Jensen and
Murphy’s (1990) …ndings) as opposed to a pay-performance sensitivity at the median variance
of 14.52. We performed a similar exercise and also found that in this case the pay-performance
sensitivities are lower than the corresponding estimates of pay-performance sensitivities at the
median variance reported in Table 2.
The previous discussion shows that the data generated by our model is consistent with the
empirical evidence. Our results therefore suggest that the correlation between variance of pro…ts
and pay-performance sensitivity might be spurious in the sense that it could be the consequence of
(unobserved) heterogeneity of managerial skills. At a more general level, while we are convinced
about the merits of the interpretation proposed by the standard principal-agent theory, we believe
that our results provide a possibly complementary explanation of the relationship between risk
and executive compensation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study a situation in which a manager’s preoccupation for his career creates a
discrepancy between his interests and those of the …rm. We show that the existence of asymmetric
information on managers’ abilities to forecast the realization of investment projects is su¢cient
to create this divergence. In the context of a two-period model we study the way and the extent
to which this divergence can be solved using explicit compensations schemes. Allowing salaries
to depend on contemporaneous performance is not always su¢cient to induce managers to make
e¢cient investment decisions in the early stages of their careers. When the initial reputation
of the manager is bad, exaggeration (overinvestment) arises, for intermediate values of initial
reputation, conservatism (underinvestment) results, while the e¢cient investment decisions are
taken in equilibrium only when the initial reputation of the manager is su¢ciently good.
We characterize equilibrium contracts and show that the asymmetry of information on man-
33In Figure 2 we do not depict wN which is identically equal to 0.
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agers’ abilities has very di¤erent impacts at di¤erent stages of a manager’s career. While second
period compensation is monotonically increasing in performance, the asymmetry of information
creates perverse incentives in the …rst period (career concerns) that can be (partially) amended
only through nonmonotonic pay schemes.
To investigate some of the implications of our results, we have carried out two numerical
exercises that study the link between pay and performance generated by our model.
In our …rst exercise we …nd that the pay-performance sensitivity in the second period of a
manager’s career is larger than in the …rst. We argue that this increase is due to the career
concern e¤ect that arises because of the divergence between …rst and second period compensation
schemes and implies a more direct link between pay and performance in the second period, when
pay is monotonic in performance, than in the …rst, when it is not. The result is supported by
the increase in pay-performance elasticity of CEOs of large US companies in their …nal years
of employment documented by Gibbons and Murphy (1992). Our model therefore provides an
alternative explanation for this empirical …nding.
Our second exercise analyzes the relationship between risk and executive compensation. Stan-
dard principal-agent models with managerial risk aversion imply that a lower pay-performance
sensitivity is an optimal response to an increase in the exogenous variance of pro…ts. Aggarwal
and Samwick’s (1999) empirical …ndings have given support to this view.
Our results also imply that the pay-performance sensitivity is positive but decreasing in the
variance of …rm’s pro…ts. Our work is, therefore, also in line with Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999)
…ndings but it suggests that the negative association between risk and pay-performance sensitivity
could also arise because the managers with the highest pay-performance sensitivities are the ones
who generate the lowest variance of pro…ts. Since the two models are observationally equivalent
in this dimension, we see our result as an alternative or possibly complementary explanation for
this empirical regularity.
Our model can produce a number of additional testable predictions that can shed light on the
intratemporal and intertemporal relationships among managerial compensation and measures of
…rm performance, such as investment or pro…t. We believe that our results provide an encouraging
…rst step in this direction.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove a sequence of claims.
1. No separating equilibrium exists, that is to say no equilibrium exists in which di¤erent types
of manager accept di¤erent o¤ers.
Suppose such an equilibrium exists, and let
¡
wBN ;w
B
F ;w
B
S
¢
denote the o¤er accepted by a
bad manager. For any …rm o¤ering this contract not to have an incentive to withdraw
it, it is necessary that wBN = w
B
F = w
B
S = 0. Let
¡
wGN ;w
G
F ;w
G
S
¢ 6= ¡wBN; wBF ; wBS ¢ denote
the o¤er the good manager accepts. Since
¡
wGN ;w
G
F ;w
G
S
¢ 2 R3+, the salary in at least one
state has to be strictly positive. Given this, the bad manager would prefer
¡
wGN ;w
G
F ; w
G
S
¢
to¡
wBN ; w
B
F ; w
B
S
¢
= (0; 0;0) and a contradiction is obtained.
Consider now pooling equilibria.
2. If a pooling equilibrium exists it has to be such that …rms’s expected pro…ts are exactly
pz ¡ 1.
If …rms’s expected pro…ts were less than pz ¡ 1 a pro…table deviation for them would be to
withdraw all o¤ers and invest on their own, which gives an expected pro…t of pz ¡ 1. Let
(¼1; ¼2) denote the expected equilibrium payo¤s to …rms 1 and 2, suppose max (¼1; ¼2) >
pz¡1 and suppose, without loss of generality, that ¼1 = max(¼1;¼2). Let ew = ( ewN ; ewF ; ewS)
denote the o¤er made by …rm 1 and that is accepted with positive probability by the
manager. Then, it is straightforward to recognize that there is an " > 0, such that bw =
( ewN + "; ewF + "; ewS + ") is a pro…table deviation for …rm 2 as bw is strictly preferred for all
" > 0 and there is an " > 0 such that the expected pro…t to …rm 2 is strictly larger than ¼2.
3. If a pooling equilibrium exists it has to be such that the e¢cient investment strategy is
played.
Suppose this is not the case and let (wN ;wF ;wS) denote the o¤er which is accepted by both
types of manager. Suppose that after having accepted (wN ;wF ;wS) the manager does not
play according to(I; N; I). From Lemma 1 he will play either (I; I; I) or (N;N;I):
(a) Suppose the manager plays (I; I; I). This implies that (wN ;wF ; wS) = (0; 0; 0). Con-
sider (w0N ; w
0
F ; w
0
S) such that w
0
N = w
0
F = w
0
S = ¹2 (1 ¡ p) ¡ " with " 2 (0;¹2 (1 ¡ p)).
This o¤er is strictly preferred by both types of managers, and since after accepting
this o¤er the manager would play (I; N; I), the expected pro…t to the …rm would be
pz ¡ 1 + ", a contradiction
(b) Suppose the manager plays (N; N; I). This implies that wN > pwS+(1 ¡ p)wF . Con-
sider nowan alternative o¤er (w0N ;w0F ; w0S) = (wN ¡ ®; 0;wS + ")with " 2
³
0; wNp ¡wS
´
and ® 2
³
0; p
(1¡p)"
´
. It is easy to check that such an o¤er is strictly preferred only by
the good manager and it would yield expected gross pro…ts of p (z ¡ 1 ¡ w0S)¡(1¡p)w0N
which, for " su¢ciently small, can be shown to be larger than ¹p (z ¡ 1 ¡ wS) ¡ (1 ¡
¹p)wN. Therefore, (w0N ; w
0
F ; w
0
S) would be a pro…table deviation and a contradiction
arises.
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4. If a pooling equilibrium exists, the o¤er accepted by both types of managers is such that
wF = 0.
Recall from 3 above that, if a pooling equilibrium exists it has to be such that the e¢cient
investment action pro…le is played. Suppose, contrary to the claim that the o¤er accepted
in equilibrium by both types of manager, w = (wN ;wF ; wS) is such that wF > 0. Consider
another o¤er bw = (bwN ; bwF ; bwS) = (wN ;0; wS + ") : It is easy to recognize that there is an
" > 0 such that bw is strictly preferred only by the good manager and that gives an expected
payo¤ to the …rm strictly larger than pz ¡ 1, a contradiction.
5. No equilibrium can exist in which both managers accept an o¤er di¤erent from¡
w2N; w
2
F ;w
2
S
¢
=
µ
¹2(1 ¡ p)
1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2
; 0;
¹2(1 ¡ p)
p (1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2)
¶
:
From 2-4 above we know that if a pooling equilibrium exists, it is such that the manager
plays the e¢cient investment action pro…le, such that …rms’ expected pro…ts are pz ¡ 1 and
such that the accepted o¤er is such that wF = 0. Given this if a pooling equilibrium exists
the accepted o¤er (wN ;0;wS ) 2 R3+ has to be such that
pwS ¸ wN (3)
pwS + (1 ¡ p)¹2wN = ¹2 (1 ¡ p) (4)
The thick segment on Figure 8 depicts the contracts that satisfy all previous conditions. The
lines (IC) and (FE) correspond to the conditions (3) and (4). Notice that their intersection
lies on
¡
w2S ;w
2
N
¢
. Since expected salaries for the good and the bad manager are, respectively,
pwS + (1 ¡ p)wN and pwS, UG and UB represent the indi¤erence curves of the good and
the bad manager respectively. Consider any contract on the thick segment of (FE) di¤erent
from
¡
w2S; w
2
N
¢
such as contract w depicted in Figure 8. All contracts in the interior of
the triangle marked with a circle are strictly preferred by the good manager and give an
expected payo¤ strictly larger than pz ¡ 1, thus constituting a pro…table deviation.
6. There exists an equilibrium in which both types of manager accept o¤er¡
w2N; w
2
F ;w
2
S
¢
=
µ
¹2(1 ¡ p)
1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2
; 0;
¹2(1 ¡ p)
p (1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2)
¶
:
First notice that if wS ¸ wN a good manager invests e¢ciently and gets utility pwS +
(1 ¡ p)wN , so that for all contracts below the 45 degree line his indi¤erence curve is like
the negatively sloped line Figure 1. Consider now the bad manager. Since the bad manager
invests if and only if pwS ¸ wN, i.e., if the contract he accepts is below the (IC) line, his
utility below the (IC) line will be wS and above it will be wN so that his indi¤erence curve
will be like the kinked line in Figure 1.
Consider now the indi¤erence curves of the two types of manager passing through the
contract mentioned in the claim (at the intersection of the rightmost part of (FE) and
(IC) as in Figure 1). Suppose that a pro…table deviation for a …rm exists that attracts only
the good manager. This means that there is a contract below the 45 degree line, above
the indi¤erence curve for the good manager and below the indi¤erence curve for the bad
manager. From Figure 1 it is easy to see that if the good manager prefers a contract toµ
¹2(1 ¡ p)
1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2
;0;
¹2(1 ¡ p)
p(1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2)
¶
;
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the bad manager will too and a contradiction is obtained. Suppose now that a pro…table
deviation exists that attracts both types of manager. It is easy to see that any contract
preferred by both types of manager will be above the full extraction condition (FE) and will
therefore imply a pro…t less than pz ¡ 1 for the …rm, a contradiction. It is easy to see that
no pro…table deviation can exist that attracts only the bad manager, and the claim follows.
From 1-6 the claim of Proposition 1 follows.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
From Proposition 1 the o¤er accepted by the manager in all second period continuation equi-
libria is: ¡
w2N
¡
¹2
¢
;w2F
¡
¹2
¢
; w2S
¡
¹2
¢¢
=
µ
¹2(1 ¡ p)
1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2 ;0;
¹2(1 ¡ p)
p(1 + (1 ¡ p)¹2)
¶
:
This implies that expected second period payo¤ for all second period continuation equilibria for
a manager of type ¿ = G;B, given that the perceived probability that he is good conditional on
the history at the end of the …rst period is ¹2, will be:
E
£
w2 j i2 ¡w2¢ ; ¹2;G¤ = ¹2(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ p)
1 +¹2(1 ¡ p)
E
£
w2 j i2 ¡w2¢ ;¹2; B¤ = ¹2(1 ¡ p)
1 +¹2(1 ¡ p)
Given these preliminaries we will now prove Proposition 2 through a series of Lemmas. Given
all second period continuation equilibria are payo¤ equivalent, all the statements to be proved are
valid for all continuation equilibria and therefore no explicit reference to second period continua-
tion equilibria will be made.
A.2.1 Part 1
Lemma 4 Let (¹;z; ±) 2 [0;1]£
³
1
p ;1
´
£R+ be given. Suppose that there exists a w1 2 R3+ such
that i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I; N;I). Then 8(¹0; z0) : ¹0 ¸ ¹ and z0 ¸ 1p, there exists a w10 2 R3+ such that
i1
¡
w10;¹
¢
= (I; N;I) :
Proof. Suppose that there exists a w1 2 R3+ such that i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I; N; I). This means that
w1N + ±
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p · (1 ¡ p)w
1
F + p
µ
w1S + ±
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p)
¶
(5)
w1N + ± (1 ¡ p) ¸ w1F (6)
w1N + ± (1 ¡ p) · w1S + ±
¹ (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 +¹ (1 ¡ p) (7)
¹ (1 ¡ p) = ¹ (1 ¡ p)w1N +(1 ¡ ¹) (1 ¡ p)w1F + pw1S (8)
It is easy to see that (5)-(8) hold for all z ¸ 1p as they are independent of z.
Now consider ¹0 > ¹ and note that ¹ appears only in (5), (7), and (8). Totally di¤erentiating
(8) with respect to w1S and ¹ and rearranging we get
dw1S
d¹
=
1 ¡ p
p
¡
1 ¡ w1N + w1F
¢ ¸ 0 (9)
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with the inequality following from the fact that, by (8) and non-negativity of salaries, w1N · 1.
Consider now ¹0 > ¹. By (9) one can choose w10S > w1S such that given
¡
w1N; w
1
F
¢
(8) holds.
Now it is easy to check that (5)-(7) are also satis…ed, due to the fact that w10S > w1S and ¹0 > ¹
and therefore
¹0 (1 ¡ p)
1 +¹0 (1 ¡ p) >
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p):
Lemma 5 Let z 2
³
1
p; 1
´
and ¹ = ¹¤ = ±2+±¡p be given. Then i
1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I;N;I) if and only
if ¡
w1N; w
1
F ;w
1
S
¢
=
µ
0;
± (1 ¡ p) (1 + ± ¡ p)
(1 + ±) (2 ¡ p) ; (1 ¡ p)
±
1 + ±
¶
:
Proof. Let ¹ = ¹¤ = ±2+±¡p. From (5) and (7), substituting the full extraction constraint (8),
we have
w1N · (1 ¡ p) ±
w1F (1 + ±) (2 ¡ p) ¡ ± (1 ¡ p) (1 + ± ¡ p)
(2 ¡ p)2 (1 + ±)2
w1N · (1 ¡ p)
w1F (1 + ±) (2 ¡ p) ¡ ± (1 ¡ p) (1 + ± ¡ p)
(1 + ±) (¡2p + p2 ¡ ±)
whose only nonnegative solution is w1N = 0; w
1
F =
±(1¡p)(1+±¡p)
(1+±)(2¡p) . It is easy to verify that this
solution satis…es (6). From the full extraction condition we get w1S = (1 ¡ p) ±1+± which concludes
the proof.
Lemma 6 Let z 2
³
1
p ;1
´
and ¹ < ¹¤ = ±2+±¡p be given. Then, there exists no w
1 2 R3+ such
that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (I;N;I).
Proof. Let (¹;z) 2 [0; 1] £
³
1
p; 1
´
be given and consider any w1 2 R3+ such that i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
=
(I; N; I) : From (5) and (7), substituting the full extraction constraint (8), we have
w1N ·
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹(1 ¡ p)w
1
F ¡ (1 ¡ p)
³
¹ (p¡ 1)2+ (1 ¡ ¹p)
´
± ¡¹ (1 +¹(1 ¡ p)) (2 ¡ p)
(1 +¹(1 ¡ p))2 (2 ¡ p) (10)
w1N · ¡
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ p)
(p+ ¹(1 ¡ p))w
1
F +(1 ¡ p)
¹ (1 +¹(1 ¡ p))¡ p(1 ¡¹)±
(p + ¹(1 ¡ p)) (1 + ¹(1 ¡ p)) (11)
A necessary condition for existence of
¡
w1N ; w
1
F
¢ 2 R2+ satisfying (10) and (11) is that w1F 2 R+
exists that satis…es (10) and (11) for w1N = 0. We therefore have
w1F ¸
³
¹ (p¡ 1)2+ (1 ¡ ¹p)
´
± ¡¹ (1 +¹(1 ¡ p)) (2 ¡ p)
¹ (1 +¹(1 ¡ p)) (2 ¡ p)
w1F ·
¹ (1 +¹(1 ¡ p)) ¡ p(1 ¡¹)±
(1 ¡¹) (1 + ¹(1 ¡ p))
and a necessary condition for existence of w1F 2 R+ satisfying the above inequalities is34³
¹ (p ¡ 1)2 +(1 ¡ ¹p)
´
± ¡ ¹ (1 +¹(1 ¡ p)) (2 ¡ p)
¹ (2 ¡ p) ·
¹ (1 +¹(1 ¡ p))¡ p(1 ¡ ¹)±
(1 ¡ ¹)
34Notice that ¹ (1+ ¹(1¡ p))¡ p(1¡ ¹)± > 0.
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which can be shown to be equivalent to ¹ ¸ ¹¤.
Since, as it was argued in subsection 4.2, in equilibrium a manager always prefers a …rst period
o¤er w1 such that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (I;N;I) rather than any o¤er w10 such that i1
¡
w10;¹
¢ 6= (I; N; I),
part 1 of Proposition 2 follows easily from Lemmas 4 and 6 that show that a w1 2 R3+ such that
i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I;N;I) and satisfying full extraction exists if and only if ¹ ¸ ¹¤ = ±2+±¡p.
A.2.2 Part 2 A necessary condition that has to be satis…ed for i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (N;N;I) is
that pro…ts are higher than with (I; I; I) ; that is
¹p(z ¡ 1) ¸ pz ¡ 1 (12)
Suppose that there exists w1 2 R3+ such that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (N;N;I). Recall from Lemma 2 that
¹2 (N) =
¹(1 ¡ p)
1 ¡ ¹p (13)
¹2 (S) = 1 (14)
¹2(F) = ¹: (15)
To ease notation in the following we will make use of (14) and (15) but will not substitute (13)
until it will become necessary. Under the assumption of part 2 of Proposition 2 we have
w1N + ±
¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) ¸ (1 ¡ p)
·
w1F + ±
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 +¹ (1 ¡ p)
¸
+ p
·
w1S + ±
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p (¸16)
w1N + ±
¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 +¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p) ¸ w
1
F + ±
¹ (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 +¹ (1 ¡ p) (17)
w1N + ±
¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 +¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p) · w
1
S + ± (1 ¡ p) (18)
(1 ¡ ¹)w1N + ¹ (1 ¡ p)w1N + ¹pw1S = ¹p (z ¡ 1) ¡ (pz ¡ 1) (19)
Lemmas 7-9 prepare for the proof of part 2 of Proposition 2.
Lemma 7 Suppose that
¡
w1N; w
1
F ;w
1
S
¢ 2 R3+ satis…es (16). Then ¡w1N ;0; w1S¢ 2 R3+ (i) also satis-
…es (16) and (ii) satis…es (17) with strict inequality.
Proof. Part (i) of the Lemma is trivial. Given this, to prove part (ii), set w1F = 0. Adding
± ¹
2(N)(1¡p)(1¡p)
1+¹2(N)(1¡p) to both sides of (16) and simplifying we get
w1N + ±
¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 + ¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) ¸ pw
1
S + ±
·
¹ (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p) + p
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p +
¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡ p)
1 +¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p)
¸
(20)
Given (20) for (17) to hold it is su¢cient that
pw1S + ±
·
¹ (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p) + p
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p +
¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡ p)
1 +¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p)
¸
¸ ±¹ (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 +¹ (1 ¡ p)
or
pw1S + ±
·
p
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p +
¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) ¡
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p)
¸
¸ 0 (21)
Since w1S ¸ 0 and the term in bracket can be shown to be nonnegative for (¹; p) 2 (0;1)2, (21)
holds and (17) holds strictly.
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Lemma 8 Suppose that there exist a w1 2 R3+ such that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (N;N;I) and such that (16)
holds with strict inequality. Then there exists a w10 2 R3+ such that i1
¡
w10; ¹
¢
= (N; N; I) and
(16) holds with equality.
Proof. Suppose that the assumption of the Lemma is true. By Lemma 7 set w1F = 0 without
loss of generality. From (19) totally di¤erentiating with respect to w1N and w
1
S we get
(1 ¡¹p)dw1N + ¹pdw1S = 0
dw1S
dw1N
= ¡1 ¡ ¹p
¹p
< 0:
This implies that we can increase w1S and decrease w
1
N without violating (18) until (16) is satiated.
By Lemma 7, if (16) holds, so does (17).
Lemma 9 Suppose that for a given (¹; z; ±) 2 [0;1] £
³
1
p; 1
´
£ R+ a w1 2 R3+ exists such that
i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (N;N;I). Then there exist a w10 2 R3+ such that (16) and (19) hold with equality
and (17) and (18) hold with strict inequality.
Proof. By Lemma 7 set w1F = 0 without loss of generality. The fact that (17) holds with strict
inequality when (16) holds (strictly or not) has already been shown in Lemma 7. By Lemma 8
we can now concentrate on the case in which (16) holds with equality. If w1S > w
1
N , then (18)
trivially holds strictly. Consider now the case in which w1N ¸ w1S. By (16) holding with equality
and by
±
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p) < w
1
S + ±
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p
we have that
w1N + ±
¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) < w
1
S + ±
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p:
Multiplying through by (2 ¡ p) we get
w1N (2 ¡ p) + ±
¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 +¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p) < w
1
S (2 ¡ p) + ± (1 ¡ p) :
Subtracting w1N (1 ¡ p) from both sides we get
w1N + ±
¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 + ¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) < w
1
S (2 ¡ p) ¡ w1N (1 ¡ p) + ± (1 ¡ p) : (22)
Recalling that w1N ¸ w1S and adding (1 ¡ p)
¡
w1N ¡w1S
¢ ¸ 0 to the right hand side of (22) we get
w1N + ±
¹2 (N ) (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 + ¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) < w
1
S (2 ¡ p) ¡w1N (1 ¡ p) + (1 ¡ p)
¡
w1N ¡w1S
¢
+ ± (1 ¡ p)
= w1S (2 ¡ p) ¡w1N (1 ¡ p) + (1 ¡ p) w1N ¡ (1 ¡ p) w1S + ± (1 ¡ p)
= w1S + ± (1 ¡ p)
which concludes the proof.
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Lemma 10 Let (¹;z; ±) 2 [0; 1] £
³
1
p;1
´
£ R+ be given. Suppose that there exists a w1 2 R3+
such that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (N;N;I) and such that …rst period expected pro…t is higher than under
(I; I; I). Then, for all (¹0; z0) such that ¹0 ¸ ¹ and z 0 2
h
1
p; z
i
, there exists w10 2 R3+ such that
i1
¡
w10;¹
¢
= (N;N;I).
Proof. By Lemma 7 set w1F = 0 without loss of generality. Rewrite (16) as
w1N + ± (1 ¡ p)
·
¹2 (N)
1 +¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) ¡
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 +¹ (1 ¡ p)
¸
¸ p
·
w1S + ±
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p
¸
or
w1N + ± (1 ¡ p)f (¹; p) ¸ p
·
w1S + ±
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p
¸
(23)
where
f (¹;p) =
¹2 (N)
1 + ¹2 (N) (1 ¡ p) ¡
¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 +¹ (1 ¡ p)
=
¹(1¡p)
1¡¹p
1 + ¹(1¡p)1¡¹p (1 ¡ p)
¡ ¹ (1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹ (1 ¡ p)
and notice that
@f (¹; p)
@¹
> 0
for all (¹;p) 2 (0;1)2.
From Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 we know that if for a given (¹; z; ±) 2 [0; 1] £
³
1
p; 1
´
£ R+ there
exists a w1 2 R3+ such that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (N; N; I), then there also exists a w10 2 R3+ such that (16)
and (19) hold with equality and (17) and (18) hold as strict inequalities. Rewrite (23) (equivalent
to (16)) with equality
w1N + ± (1 ¡ p)f (¹;p) = p
·
w1S + ±
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p
¸
:
Since @f(¹;p)@¹ > 0 for all (¹;p) 2 (0; 1)2, when ¹ increases to ¹0 2 (¹;¹¤), if we increase w1S and
w1N by the same (absolute) amount so as to satisfy (19) for ¹
0, (23) will still be satis…ed and so
will (17) and (18).
To conclude the proof we only need to show that the di¤erence between the expected pro…t
under (N; N; I) and under (I; I; I) is increasing with ¹ and decreasing with z. Let
h(¹;z) = ¹p(z ¡ 1) ¡ (pz ¡ 1) :
Then it is easy to see that
@h (¹;z)
@¹
= p (z ¡ 1) > 0
@h (¹;z)
@z
= ¹p¡ p = ¡p (1 ¡¹) < 0:
So far we have proved that, if there exists a contract such that in the continuation equilibrium
i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (N;N;I) for a given (¹;z), there will also exist a contract such that in the continuation
28
equilibrium i1
¡
w1; ¹0
¢
= (N;N;I) for all ¹0 2 [¹;¹¤) and z 0 2
h
1
p; z
i
. The following Lemma
provides an explicit expression for the frontier ez (¹) such that there exists a w1 2 R3+ such
that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (N;N;I) if and only if (¹;z) 2 (0; 1) £
h
1
p; ez (¹)i and shows that the set
(0;1) £
h
1
p; ez (¹)i has positive measure on the space (¹;z).]
Lemma 11 Let (p; ±) 2 (0;1) £ R+ be …xed. Let ez (¹) be such that there exists a w1 2 R3+ such
that i1
¡
w1; ¹
¢
= (N;N;I) if and only if (¹;z) 2 (0; 1) £
h
1
p; ez (¹)i. Then
1. ez (¹) = (1 ¡¹p) µ 1p(1¡¹) ¡ ± (1¡p)(¹p2¡4¹p+3¹+1)(2¡p)(1+¹¡¹p)(1¡3¹p+¹+¹p2)¶;
2. There exists a ¹ 2 (0; ¹¤) such that ez (¹) = 1p;
3. ez (¹¤) > 1p;
4. (¹0; z0) 2 (0; 1) £
h
1
p; ez (¹)i implies (12).
Proof. By Lemma 7 set w1F = 0 without loss of generality. By Lemma 9 we can restrict without
loss of generality to w1 2 R3+ such that (16) and (19) hold with equality. We then have
w1N = pw
1
S + ±
·
¹(1 ¡ p)2
1 + ¹(1 ¡ p) ¡
¹2(N )(1 ¡ p)
1 +¹2(N)(1 ¡ p) + p
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p
¸
(24)
w1N = ¡
¹p
1 ¡¹pw
1
S +
¹p(z ¡ 1) ¡ (pz ¡ 1)
1 ¡ ¹p (25)
A necessary and su¢cient condition for a solution
¡
w1N ;w
1
S
¢ 2 R2+ to exist is that
¹p(z ¡ 1) ¡ (pz ¡ 1)
1 ¡ ¹p ¸ ±
·
¹(1 ¡ p)2
1 +¹(1 ¡ p) ¡
¹2(N)(1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹2(N )(1 ¡ p) + p
1 ¡ p
2 ¡ p
¸
(26)
Since (26) implies (12) part 4 follows. From (26) we get
ez (¹) = (1 ¡ ¹p)Ã 1
p (1 ¡ ¹) ¡ ±
(1 ¡ p) ¡¹p2 ¡ 4¹p +3¹ + 1¢
(2 ¡ p) (1 + ¹ ¡¹p) (1 ¡ 3¹p +¹ + ¹p2)
!
which proves part 1. Since by Lemma 10 ez (¹) is increasing, to prove parts 2 and 3 it is su¢cient
to show that ez (0) < 1p and ez (¹¤) > 1p : which can be veri…ed through straightforward calculations.
Recall from (1) that if ¹ and z are such that z · 1¡¹pp(1¡¹) the expected gross pro…t of (N; N; I)
is larger than that of (I; I; I). Given this and noticing that ez (¹¤) · 1¡¹p
p(1¡¹) , it is easy to see that
if (¹; z) 2 (0;1) £
h
1
p; ez (¹)i in equilibrium a manager always prefers a …rst period o¤er w1 such
that i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (N;N;I) rather than any o¤er w10 such that i1
¡
w10;¹
¢
= (I; I; I). Given this
part 2 of Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemmas 10 and 11.
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A.2.3 Part 3 To prove part 3 of Proposition 2, consider the following Lemma.
Lemma 12 Let (¹; z; ±) 2 [0;1] £
³
1
p; 1
´
£ R+ be given. Then, i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I; I; I) if and only
if w1 = (0;0; 0).
Proof. Suppose that there exists a w1 2 R3+ such that i1
¡
w1;¹
¢
= (I; I; I). Using Lemma 2 the
incentive compatibility constraints and the full extraction condition are:
w1N + ±
¹(1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹(1 ¡ p) · (1 ¡ p)w
1
F + pw
1
S + ±
¹(1 ¡ p)
1 + ¹(1 ¡ p)
w1N + ±
¹(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ p)
1 +¹(1 ¡ p) · w
1
F + ±
¹(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ p)
1 +¹(1 ¡ p)
w1N + ±
¹(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ p)
1 +¹(1 ¡ p) · w
1
S + ±
¹ (1 ¡ p) (2 ¡ p)
1 +¹ (1 ¡ p)
0 = (1 ¡ p)w1F + pw1S
whose only solution is
w1N = w
1
S = w
1
F = 0:
Noticing that this is the only solution for all (¹;z) 2 [0;1] £
h
1
p;1
´
concludes the proof.
By parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 for ¹ 2 [0;¹¤) and z > ez (¹) there exist no w1 2 R3+ such
that i1
¡
w1;¹
¢ 2 f(N;N;I) ; (I;N;I)g and by Lemma 12 we can now conclude that ¹ 2 [0;¹¤) and
z > ez (¹) the manager’s …rst period o¤er w1 will be such that i1 ¡w1; ¹¢ 2 (I; I; I) thus proving
part 3 of Proposition 2.
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Figure 2: Second period equilibrium contracts. w2N (¹), w2S (¹) are represented, respectively, by
the dashed and the solid curves. w2F (¹) is identically equal to 0.
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(I; N;I)(I; I; I)
(N;N;I )
10
6z
-
¹±
2+±¡p
1
p
Figure 3: Equilibrium investment action pro…les
Figure 4: First period equilibrium contracts.
w1N (¹), w
1
F (¹), w
1
S (¹) are represented, respectively, by plus signs, dots and circles.
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Figure 5: Density functions of Beta distributions
Horizontal axis: 100¹; Vertical axis: f (¹) =100
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Figure 6: Variance of pro…ts for a …rm with a manager in his …rst period and beginning of
period probability of being good equal to ¹.
Figure 7: Variance of pro…ts for a …rm with a manager in his second period and beginning of
period probability of being good equal to ¹.
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Table 1
OLS coe¢cients for periods 1 and 2
Pro…ts gross of Pro…ts net of
salary payments salary payments
® ¯ Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 Period 2
1 1 0:0439 0:1438 ¡0:0072 0:1021
3 1.5 0:0284 0:1863 ¡0:0118 0:1531
1.5 3 0:0191 0:1043 ¡0:0064 0:0841
3 3 0:0245 0:1475 ¡0:0117 0:1191
Table 2
OLS coe¢cients for speci…cation (2)
(salaries vs. pro…ts gross of salary
payments; average of two periods)
® ¯ °1 °2 °1 +0:5°2 °1+ °2
1 1 0:1767 ¡0:1732 0:0901 0:0035
3 1.5 0:1642 ¡0:1219 0:1032 0:0423
1.5 3 0:1399 ¡0:1376 0:0711 0:0023
3 3 0:1620 ¡0:1484 0:0878 0:0136
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